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ABSTRACT
How important are economies of scale and scope in advertising agency
operations? This paper reports an econometric study undertaken to address this
question. Cost models are formulated which represent how the principal
component of agency costs, employment level, varies according to the mix of
media and services an agency provides and the total volume of advertising it
produces. These models are estimated and tested cross-sectionally utilizing
data pertaining to the domestic operations of 401 US agencies for 1987.
The empirical evidence reported here indicates that both scale and scope
economies are highly significant in the operations of US advertising agencies.
We find that of the 12,000 establishments comprising the industry in 1987,
approximately 200-250 had domestic gross incomes of $3-4 million or more (or
equivalently, billings of $20-27 million) and therefore had service mixes and
operating levels sufficiently large to take full advantage of all available
size-related efficiencies. Furthermore, the overall structure of the industry
is one where these large, fully efficient firms created and produced more than
half of all the national advertising utilized in the US during 1987. At the
same time, vast numbers of very small agencies appear to operate with
substantial cost disadvantages compared to large firms as a consequence of these
scale and scope economies.
These findings carry important implications concerning possible future
changes in the industry structure. It seems highly doubtful that scale
economies could motivate further mergers among the largest 200-250 agencies. On
the other hand, for small agencies, mergers and acquisitions might be attractive
as means of mitigating their size-related cost disadvantages. Finally, our
findings demonstrating the existence of scale and scope economies are consistent
with the diminishing reliance on fixed rates of media commissions as the
principal basis of agency compensation. They also cast strong doubts on size-
related economies in operating costs as a viable explanation for the limited
degree of vertical integration of agency services by large advertisers.
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by Alvin J. Silk and Ernst R. Berndt
I. INTRODUCTION
How significant are economies of scale and scope in advertising agency
operations? This question bears directly on several fundamental and inter-
related issues relating to the organization of the advertising agency industry,
including: (1) the magnitude of cost advantages associated with increasing
agency size; (2) the breadth of the line of services agencies can efficiently
deliver to clients; (3) the economic rationale underlying agency mergers and
acquisitions; (4) the potential for vertical integration of agency services into
client organizations; and (5) the viability of alternative agency-client
compensation arrangements. Controversy surrounding these matters is scarcely
new, and indeed, as is clear from the industry's history (Pope [1983]), these
issues have played a central role in how the industry has evolved.
In recent years concern about agency scale and scope has once again arisen
as conditions affecting the demand for agency services in the U.S. have under-
gone important changes. Growth in aggregate domestic advertising expenditures
has slackened, especially in real terms (Coen [1990]). In several key sectors,
client merger and acquisitions have elevated concentration levels (Winski
[1990]) and the shares of marketing budgets allocated to consumers and trade
promotions have risen at the expense of expenditures on media advertising (Edel
[1987]). Responding to these developments, the agency industry is presently in
the midst of a re-structuring process and there is much speculation and debate
about how the nature of agency operations and the industry's organization may
ultimately be re-configured (Bernstein [1989], Economist [1990], Jones [1989],
O'Toole [1990]).
Advertising agencies are multi-product firms and the behavior of costs as
firm size and service mix change is one of the critical factors influencing an
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industry's competitive structure (Scherer [1980]). An understanding of cost
behavior may contribute to resolving conflicting views and uncertainties which
presently surround several facets of the industry re-structuring.
Many of the mergers and takeovers which occurred in the past decade
involved the largest firms in the industry and served not only to increase the
scale of their operations, but also to expand the range of services available to
clients (Business Week [1986], Millman [1988]). This raises questions about the
magnitude of cost advantages that large agencies are able to realize as a result
of both their greater size (economies of scale) and their ability to engage in
the joint production of a broad as opposed to a more narrow line of services
(economies of scope). Given limited growth in aggregate advertising
expenditures, whether future concentration may occur will depend, in part, on
the particular levels of output at which economies of scale and scope are
effectively exhausted.
The design of agency compensation arrangements, a major source of agency-
client discord throughout the industry's history (Haase [1934], Young [1933]) is
also affected by the presence of scale and scope economies. There is evidence
that, at least among very large advertisers, reliance on the longstanding
practice of setting agency compensation at 15% of a client's media expenditures
is eroding (Weilbacher [1989]). Weilbacher [1990] attributes this change to
client pressure for negotiated rates as a result of their recognizing a
"fundamental flaw" in the flat 15% commission, namely, the fallacious underlying
assumption of no economies of scale in agency operations. Weilbacher [1990, p.
7] argues that scale economies are realized at the account level ("agency costs
tend to decline proportionately as the size of the advertising appropriations
for a brand or an advertising account grows") and predicts growing acceptance of
a sliding scale of media commission rates. To the best of the authors' present
- Page 2 -
SCALE AND SCOPE EFFECTS 
- Page 3 -
knowledge, no empirical evidence of account-specific scale economies has
appeared in the public domain, although experienced agency management are on
record as acknowledging the phenomenon (McNamara [1990, p. 82], Morgan [1990b]).
Client preferences for negotiated and cost-based compensation arrangements
are often coupled with demands for the "unbundling" of agency services
(Achenbaum [1990], Economist [1990]). Thus, the policy alternatives for a
client are to employ a full-service agency or to utilize some combination of
specialized in-house or outside agencies for particular functions such as
creative and media buying services. Similar demands arose in the adverse
climate of the early 1970's (Loomis [1972]) and led full-service agencies to
modify their strategies such as by offering a la carte services and
emphasizing their creative product (Claggert [1988], Jones [1990]). Clearly,
the extent to which agency operations are subject to scale and scope economies
affects the feasibility of these organizational alternatives.
Despite the persistence of these institutional issues, there has been
little economic analysis of the advertising agency industry since the Frey-Davis
[1955] and Gamble [1959] studies, save surveys of industry practices by
professional associations and trade publications.1 The only econometric study
addressing the question of agency scale and scope economies known to the present
authors is that due to Schmalensee, Silk and Bojanek [1983] (hereafter referred
to as SSB). They estimated nonlinear cost functions using 1977 data for a
cross-section of 91 U.S. agencies and concluded that over 200 US agencies were
large enough to exhuast essentially all economies of scale.
The present paper extends and updates the earlier work of SSB. We
estimate a similar set of cost models to that analyzed by SSB, employing a data
base covering 1987 operations for a much larger sample of 401 US agencies.
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Application of a series of specification tests leads to selection of a preferred
model from which we derive measures of the importance of economies of scale and
scope on agency costs. The plan of the paper is as follows.
We begin in section II by setting forth alternative specifications for two
plausible classes of cost functions which we refer to as "scale" and "scope"
models. Section III discusses the sample of agencies and measures of the
variables used in econometric estimation. Section IV summarizes the results
from various specifications, describes the model selection procedure employed,
and presents several measures of scale and scope effects derived from the
preferred models. Implications of the results relating to the organization of
the advertising agency industry are discussed in section V. The final section
summarizes the main findings and conclusions.
II. SPECIFICATION OF ALTERNATIVE COST FUNCTIONS
We begin with a theoretical overview of alternative specifications for
cost functions, repeating in part the discussion given in SSB. For the moment,
let us suppose we are dealing with a single-product industry, whose average cost
function is approximately L-shaped, with average cost approaching an asymptotic
lower bound as a scale-related Z-variable approaches infinity. As SSB note, a
reasonable specification for a cost function having such a shape is:
U - a + e'7Z, (1)
where U is a measure of average cost, Z is a scale-related variable, and a, P
and 7 are (assumed positive) parameters. This function is illustrated in Figure
1, and as SSB observe, its shape is broadly consistent with the literature on
economies of scale in many industries (Johnston [1960, Chapter 4]).2
(Insert Figure 1 Near Here -- See Page 43)
11
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Given positive values of the parameters, equation (1) implies that U is an
everywhere-decreasing function of Z, so there is no finite Z at which scale
economies are completely exhausted. Note that as Z - a, U - a. We will say
that scale economies are essentially exhausted for a firm of size Z if U(Z*) -
(l+e)a, where e is a small number. Solving for Z*, we obtain an indicator of
minimum efficient scale as:
Z*- -(1/~) ln(~/~). (2)
In this paper we set e - .01, so that a scale of Z corresponds to costs one
percent above the asymptotic minimum.
Another measure of the importance of scale economies is the cost penalty
incurred by firms operating at inefficiently small scales. If a firm's scale is
kZ*, where 0 < k < 1, its cost disadvantage relative to a firm of scale Z* is
given by:
D* [U(kZ ) - U(Z )] [k(/a)-k - ](3)
* [1 + ]U(Z )
In this paper we set k - 0.5, in order to permit comparability with similar
estimates for other industries.3 Illustrative values for Z* and D* are
displayed in Figure 1.
Instead of producing but one product, now assume a firm produces N outputs
and that equation (1), with j subscripts everywhere, refers to the unit cost of
the jth product where the unit cost term U is now defined as total costs divided
by gross income Yi. Multiplying by the revenue share Sj and summing, we can
obtain the basic equation for long-run costs as:
N N
u- E a.S + Pj.S.exp(-7jZ). (4)
j-1 j j-1 3 3 - j
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Depending on the specification, Z can take on alternative functions of all the
output levels.
Following SSB, we specify the term in equation (4) involving Zj in two
alternative and polar ways. We do not have any prior assumption that one or the
other must be the true specification, but rather regard these two specifications
as likely to bracket the truth. In particular, if on the basis of our specifi-
cation tests (discussed later in this paper) we are led to reject one of them,
the other might sensibly be treated as a good approximation to the correct spec-
ification. If not, our assumption that they bracket the truth implies that any
qualitative statement supported by both specifications is likely to be correct.
The first polar case is one we call a scope model, in which the scale
variable for all products is simply the overall size of the ith agency, measured
by gross income Yi, where Yi X ZjYij and Yij is the ith firm's gross income from
medium j. Following SSB, we specify five partially nested scope models:
U. - a + P exp(-Y i) + ui (5.1)
9
U i - a.S.. + exp(--Y i) + (5.2)j-l 1j
9 9
i a .S. + ljSijexp(-Yi) + ui(5.3)j-1 j-1j
9 9
Ui a jSi j + Sijexp(-'jYi) + u. (5.4)
j-1 i j-1 1
9 9
Ui Ca Sij + X IjSij exp(-jYi) + u. (5.5)
II
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where the ui are assumed to be normal disturbance terms with all the usual
desirable properties.
To see why we call these five specifications scope models, it is useful to
consider the notion of returns to scope, and to distinguish it from returns to
scale. Briefly, what scope economies refer to is the cost savings to a firm
from producing multiple outputs, rather than splitting the firm up into N
smaller firms, each specializing in producing one and only one output.4 More
specifically, let C be total (not average) cost, and define total costs CSplit
for the notional split-up multiproduct firm as the sum of costs from producing
each of the N outputs at N distinct single-product subsidiaries:
CSplit C(Yl,O,...O) + C(OY2,0,... 0) +---+ C(O,...,OYN) (6)
where the subscript on Y refers to the jth output. Total costs for the
multiproduct firm jointly producing all N outputs is Coint - (Y1,Y2,. ,YN)
Returns to scope (RSP) are then simply computed as the percent cost savings due
to producing jointly rather than being split up, i.e.,
SP C (C)RSP - Split Joint (7)
joint
Hence, when RSP are positive, Cjoint < CSplit, and there are cost advantanges to
being a multiproduct firm, deriving perhaps from the joint utilization of shared
inputs. When RSP are zero, no such cost advantages emerge, and if RSP were
negative, the firm could reduce its costs by splitting up. The fact that very
few firms produce only a single product may well imply that RSP are available.
Consider, for example, the most general of the five scope models above,
namely, that in equation (5.5). Noting that Sij - 1 for the firm producing only
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the jth output, that for such firms Yi - Yij, and setting the ui - 0, for this
model Csplit turns out to be:
9 9
C j a.Y.. j+ lJYij exp( -yYij) . (8)
On the other hand, noting that since Sij - Yij/Yi YiSij Yij, it follows that
for equation (5.5), CJoint equals:
9 9
CJint 1 aj.Y. + jYijexp(--jYi).Y (9)j -1 j-1 i i3 i
Note that the expression in the numerator of (7), CSplit - CJoint, will in
general not depend on the a's, but will typically be non-zero because
exp(-7jYij) exp(-7jYi).
The traditional measure of returns to scale is ambiguous in the context of
multiproduct firms. To see this, recall that in the case of a single product
firm, the traditional measure of returns to scale is l/eCy, where ECy is the
elasticity of total costs with respect to output, i.e. CY - (C/aY)(Y/C). In
the single product case, it can also be shown that returns to scale equals the
ratio of average cost (C/Y) to marginal cost (8C/8Y). In the multiproduct case,
however, the notion of average cost is not well-defined (by which output does
one divide total costs?), and product mix could change with overall size (by how
much does one change the various outputs?). To overcome this problem, in the
multiproduct context one can define a returns to scale notion as based on the
effects on total costs when all outputs are increased proportionately, i.e.
holding output mix constant. This concept is called ray-returns to scale
(overall size expands on a linear ray in output space; see Bailey and
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Friedlaender [1982]). In our context, define ray returns to scale (RRS) as one
over the elasticity of total costs with respect to Yi, holding output mix fixed:
RRS - (10)
aCY.
a1 C Sij Sij
For the scope model in equation (5.5), ray returns to scale turn out to be:
9 9
j.S..J + ljSijexp(-yjYi)
jl j ij j
RRS (5.5) 
. (11)
9 9 9
E a.S.. + jSi exp(-exp(-- Yi 1j j-1 i i i j1 i3 3 j i
A polar opposite case of the scope models 5.1 to 5.5 above assumes the
complete absence of scope economies, that is, it assumes that no interactions
occur among the agencies' outputs in determining costs. If all activities are
independent, then the natural scale variable for activity j for the ith firm is
Yij, and thus Yij, not Yi, appears in the exponential term of equation (4).5
Using the same notation as above, we refer to the following as five scale
models:
9
U. - a + Sij exp(-yij + ui (12.1)1 ~j-1
9 9
U = aj Sij + Sijexp(-Yij) + i (12.2)
9 9
U. E a.jSi + j6.S. exp(-yYij)+ u. (12.3)j- 1 j-1 13
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9 9
U.= a J S. + Sij exp(-j ij ) + ui (12.4)
j1 13 313 1
9 9
Ui E a.jS + E fjSijexp( -iYij) + i (12.5)j-1 j j-1
Using the definition of returns to scope given in equation (7) above, it
can easily be verified that for each of these scale models 12.1-12.5, the
numerator in (7) is zero, i.e. RSP and scope economies are zero. However, using
the fact that Yij SijYi, ray returns to scale (RRS) for the most general scale
model in equation 12.5 can be shown to equal:
9 9
E j.l. + Sij exp(- Y.)
RRS (12.5)- . (13)
9 9 9
j .S.. + .l jSijexp(-y Yij) - E ?.jSijY i exp(-y.Y. )j 1 j 13 13 31
Several other comments are worth noting here, before completing this
discussion of alternative cost function specifications. First, for each medium
and provided estimated parameters have expected signs, one can employ parameter
estimates of the a's as the large-scale limiting values of medium-specific unit
cost, thereby generating medium-specific cost curves similar to that in Figure
1. Second, the Z minimum efficient scale statistics for the scope models
reveal the minimum agency size (Yi) for each product to be produced at nearly
minimum cost, while those computed from the scale models will yield the minimum
medium-specific incomes (Yij) necessary for the corresponding products to be
efficiently produced. Third and finally, since the D* cost penalties are in the
same units, they have identical interpretations in the scope and scale models.
III
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III. VARIABLE DEFINITIONS AND DATA BASE DESCRIPTION
In this section, we describe the variables used in the cost models, the
source of the data used to measure them, and the sample of the agencies for
which observations of the measures were obtained. The notation and variable
definitions employed are as follows:
Y - agency gross income for U.S. operations (10 millions of 1987
dollars
E - agency employment in U.S. operations (number of employees in 1987)
U E/(Y.103) or number of employees per $100,000 of 1987 gross income
Sj share of an agency's billings volume derived from source or
activity j, where j - 1,...,8 are alternative media and j-9
denotes billings and capitalized fees for all non-media
specific services
Yj - Sj*Y - estimated gross income from source or activity j.
The unit of analysis throughout is an individual agency, which, when
relevant, is denoted by the subscript, i.
Data Sources
The source of the data used to measure the above variables was the 1988
edition of Advertising Age's (1988a, pp. 4-26) annual "U.S. Advertising Agency
Profiles," a compilation of agency operating results for 1987. A noteworthy
feature of the data collection procedure was that participating agencies were
asked to submit a statement signed by an independent accountant verifying the
data reported. Among the sample of agencies analyzed here, 63.84% complied with
the request and tests indicated that this compliance was not significantly
related to agency billings volume, gross income, or employment. These results
suggest that the verification request may have served to limit the problems of
- Page 11 -
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unreliability which have sometime been noted in other sources of agency
operating data (e.g., Morgan [1990a]).
Agency Sample
The 1987 data base assembled by Advertising Age covered operating results
for 500 agencies. Missing information on one or more variables forced the
elimination of 36 agencies. The remaining 464 observations included a
substantial number of agencies which specialized in only a few minor media and
therefore had zero billings in the majority of media categories. SSB [1983]
found that large numbers of zero shares were a source of computational problems
in applying non-linear estimation procedures to the models of interest here. In
order to minimize these difficulties, we chose to eliminate from the sample
those agencies with billings in only one or two of the 16 billings categories or
with less than 10 employees. These selection criteria eliminated 63
observations and resulted in a final sample size of 401 agencies which comprise
the data base used in the subsequent analyses reported here.
It should be noted that the measures for all variables only pertain to US
operations and do not include results for international activies. In the case
of ten holding companies or "mega-agencies," the results for their subsidiaries
were excluded from the parent firm data in line with the information on these
relationships reported in Advertising Age [1988a, pp. 4 and 96]. As noted
there, these adjustments may be the source of some measurement errors.
Summary sample statistics for the variables defined above are presented in
Tables 1 and 2. As can be seen from these tables, the sample is a diverse one
in terms of size and media mix. The median 1987 gross- income per agency is
$3.23 million with a range from $380,000 to $284.7 million. Total billings
volume ranged from $1.63 million to $1.96 billion, with a median of $23.25
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Table 1
Summary Statistics for Agency Output and Cost Variables
(n - 401 Agencies)
Upper Lower
Variable Mean Median Limit Limit
Gross Income ($10 Million) 1.351 0.323 28.470 0.038
Employment 151.365 43 3723 10
Employees/Gross Income
(Employees/$100,000 GI) 1.443 1.377 3.196 0.339
Volume ($10 Million) 9.427 2.j25 196.243 0.163
Media Billings 6.990 1.289 167.900 0.011
Non-Media Billings 2.437 0.821 50.520 0.000
million. In terms of employment, the median level was 43 with the smallest work
force consisting of 10 employees while the largest had 3,723.
Clearly, the distributions of these variables are highly skewed,
reflecting the level of concentration in the agency industry. The 1987 Census
of Service Industries reports that for the 12,335 advertising agencies
(establishments) operating in that year, their total gross income (receipts) was
$10.213 billion (U.S.Bureau of the Census [1989], Table la). The corresponding
figure for the present sample of 401 agencies was $5.417 billion or 53.04% of
the industry total, which includes both national and local advertising.
Collectively, the billings volume of these 401 agencies amounted to $37.8
billion which represents 62.35% of the total amount of $60.6 billion expended on
national advertising in the U.S. during 1987 (Coen [1988]). While large
agencies are overrepresented, the sample does contain a broad distribution of
agencies of different sizes producing advertising for a wide variety of media.6
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Gross Income
An agency's gross income is best understood as the equivalent of the usual
accounting definition of "gross margin" or the difference between sales receipts
and cost of goods sold. More specifically, an agency's gross income is the sum
of revenues it receives from three basic sources: (1) commissions earned from
purchases of media time and space made on behalf of clients; (2) markups on
materials and services purchased from other suppliers and then charged to cli-
ents; (3) fees paid by clients for agency services in addition to or in lieu of
the aforementioned commissions and markups. Gross income is regarded within the
industry as the preferred measure of agency size or output because it is more
meaningful for comparative or cross sectional analysis than other indicators
such as billings volume or capitalized billings (Gardner [1976], Paster [1981]).
The latter quantities may give a misleading picture of output or scale due to
variations across agencies in media and service mixes and compensation methods.
Historically, the principal source of agency gross income has been media
commissions. Over time, as the mix of agency services and compensation arrange-
ments have changed, income from fees has grown in importance. Data from the
most recent Census of Business [1982] for which a breakdown of gross income is
available indicate that for the advertising agency industry as a whole, 59.4 of
gross income was derived from media commissions, 16.2% from markups on materials
and services purchased, 22.1% from service fees, and 2.3% from other sources
(U.S. Bureau of Census [1982], Table 6, p. 5-51). It is generally recognized
that reliance on media commissions as a source of gross income tends to increase
with increasing agency size (Paster [1981]). Summary data reported by the
American Association of Advertising Agencies ([1987], p. 13, hereafter, 4A's)
indicates that the proportion of gross income accounted for by media commissions
is 75% for "large" agencies and 35% for "small" agencies. Detailed current data
-Page 14-
SCALE AND SCOPE EFFECTS
bearing on this relationship are not available in published sources; earlier
evidence is reviewed in SSB ([1983], p. 456).
Number of Employees per Hundred Thousand Dollars of Gross Income
This ratio is employed as a proxy for an agency's average cost. As noted
by Mayer [1959, p. 74]: "In the cliche of the trade, 'an advertising agency is
nothing but people.'" Estimates show that payroll, bonuses, profit-sharing, and
related employee benefits (insurance and retirement) average about 67% of an
agency's gross income (4A's [1987], p. 13). 7 Consistent with the presence of
scale economies, partial evidence that has been released from surveys of agency
cost structures conducted annually among the membership of the 4A's indicates
that payroll expense as a percentage of gross income tends to decline cross-
sectionally as agency billings rise (McDonald [1989], Exhibit II, and McNamara
[1990], Exhibit 9-3, p. 145). While this ratio of employees to gross income is
clearly not an ideal measure of unit cost, it has advantages over "employees per
million dollars of billings" (for reasons discussed above) which has often been
used as an indicator of agency "productivity" (Advertising Age [1988], p. 96;
Gamble [1959], Loomis [1972], and Seligman [1956] and we have no reason to
suspect that its use will introduce substantial bias here.8
Share of Billings Volume by Media/Service Category
The principal services which agencies supply to their clients are those
associated with the planning of campaigns and the creation, production, and
placement of advertising messages in different media vehicles. As shown by SSB
[1983], variations in media mix are a major source of interagency cost
differentials. To measure the composition of an agency's output, we use the
share of its billings volume emanating from each of the nine categories of
activities listed in Table 2, eight of which relate to different media while the
ninth covers "non-media services."
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Table 2
Summary Statistics for Media Shares, 1987
(n - 401 Agencies)
Abbreviation Medium
TVL Network Television
Major
Cable
TVH Spot Television
MGL General Magazines
PTH Special Print
Business
Farm
Medical
Supplements
NPH Newspapers
DRH Direct Response
RDH Radio
OTH Other
Outdoor
Point of Sale
Special Events
Transit
XMB Non-Media Services
Percent Share of Agency Volume
Mean Median Zero Shares
7.46% 0.21% 45.89%
(6.87%) (0.00%) (64.09%)
(0.59%) (0.00%) (65.34%)
12.44% 7.48% 22.94%
9.40% 6.60% 8.73%
5.81% 1.69% 33.17%
(3.53%) (0.36%) (46.63%)
(0.44%) (0.00%) (89.28%)
(1.43%) (0.00%) (87.03%)
(0.40%) (0.00%) (87.78%)
8.95% 5.88% 4.74%
4.64% 0.91% 35.41%
5.99% 4.63% 11.47%
2.38% 1.04% 19.95%
(1.17%) (0.52%) (30.92%)
(0.84%) (0.00%) (69.83%)
(0.24%) (0.00%) (90.52%)
(0.13%) (0.00%) (82.29%)
42.94% 42.13% 9.23%
Share of
Sample's Total
Billing Volume
23.90%
(22.81%)
(1.09%)
18.10%
11.04%
2.78%
(1.35%)
(0.22%)
(0.94%)
(0.27%)
7.87%
2.70%
5.63%
2.13%
(1.52%)
(0.47%)
(0.06%)
(0.08%)
25.85%
100.00%
The data reported in Advertising Age [1988a] covered billings in the
fifteen separate media categories identified in Table 2. As indicated there,
we combined some of the minor media to arrive at the final set of nine cate-
gories shown in Table 2. "Specialty Print" and "Other" are both composites,
each consisting of four of the original fifteen media categories. The median
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share value for each of these eight media was less than 0.5% and zero shares
were recorded for 60% or more of the agency sample for six of these eight
categories--the exceptions were "business publications" and "outdoor" where
the percentages of zero shares were 46.6 and 30.9, respectively. Initial
efforts to include all fifteen media categories as separate variables in the
cost models proved to be computationally infeasible and led us to form these
more aggregate categories for the minor media. For similar reasons, "cable"
was combined with "major" to create the "Network Television" category.
The last share category list in Table 2, "Non-Media Services" is also a
heterogeneous one. The data available for each agency included its "volume of
total billings" which is the sum of billings in different media categories
plus "capitalized billings." The latter includes billings to clients for
materials and services purchased from outside sources and marked up (usually
at 17.65%) plus "capilalized fees" which are calculated by multiplying fee
income times 6.67--a practice favored in the industry as a means of treating
income from fees as the equivalent of the traditional 15% commission earned on
media billings (Garnder [1976], Advertising Age [1988a], p. 4). Hence, the
share term for "non-media services" shown in Table 2 is the proportion of
"total billings volume" accounted for by "capitalized billings."
Non-media share of billings volume encompassess a broad spectrum of
services, the composition of which may vary widely among agencies according to
the mix of functions performed and method of compensation. Included here are
ad production and specialized services or projects such as marketing research,
new product development, public relations, and sales promotion. This category
may also contain, in some instances, other functions for which an agency is
compensated by fees rather than media commissions, such as creative and media
planning services.
-Page 17-
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In the analysis that follows, we treat the shares of an agency's
billings volume in each media/service category as an unbiased measure of the
share of its gross income attributable to that category of output. This
assumption is strictly valid only if the ratio of gross income to billings is
a constant for all categories of output within each agency (but not
necessarily fixed across agencies). Note that while margins may vary among
accounts served within a particular agency (according to client size and
method of compensation), in general clients tend to favor constant margins
across media in order to remove any incentive for the agency to favor one
medium over another. Unfortunately, the information required to check this
condition directly is not available. However, there is some reason to suspect
that the ratio of gross income to billings for at least some media may vary
systematically with agency size. While the standard commission rate granted
agencies varies little by medium (4A's [1987], p. 12), compensation
arrangements and media mix appear to be somewhat related to agency size.
First, as noted above, there is some evidence to suggest that the
importance of media commissions as a source of gross income tends to increase
as agency gross income increases (4A's [1987] and SSB [1983], pp. 456-457).
Secondly, within our sample of agencies, we find weak cross-sectional
relationships between gross income and share of billings for selected media
categories. Table A3 in our Appendix summarizes the results obtained when
share for each of the nine categories (Sj) was regressed on the natural
logarithm of gross income (Y). The slope coefficient for gross income was
found to be statistically significant (at the .05 level or beyond, two-tail
test) for five of the nine categories. The results indicated that, on
average, the larger an agency, the larger the share of its billings volume
from network television, spot television, and general magazines but the
smaller its share from direct response and non-media billings. The only
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regressions with R2's above .076 were for network television and non-media
services where the values were .266 and .141, respectively. Hence, there is a
substantial amount of variation in media/service mix that is unrelated to
agency size. While these pieces of indirect evidence suggest the possibility
that some systematic errors may arise from taking an agency's share of its
billings volume in a media/service category as a proxy for its share of gross
income in that category, we are unable to make any firm inferences from this
limited information about the consequences of departures from the assumption
that the margin of gross income earned on billings is a constant across
categories within any given agency.
Estimated Gross Income by Media/Service Category
Estimates of gross income by media/service category (Yj) were calculated
by simply multiplying the share of an agency's billings volume in each
category (Sj) by its total gross income (Y). These quantities are used in our
scale model basic specification as proxy measures for the scale of agency
operations or output in each media/service category. The preceding discussion
of possible measurement problems with the Sj shares also applies here.
IV. RESULTS
We now discuss empirical findings, summarizing results from various
specifications, the model selection procedure employed, minimum efficient
scale, cost penalties, and estimated scope and scale economies.
Choice of Preferred Specifications
To each of the ten alternative cost function specifications (5.1)-(5.5)
and (12.1)-(12.5), we appended an independently and identically normally dis-
tributed stochastic disturbance term, having mean zero and covariance matrix
X. With this stochastic specification, equation-specific maximum likelihood
estimation is numerically equivalent to nonlinear least squares. To carry out
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estimation for our alternative models, therefore, we employed the nonlinear
least squares algorithms in the Time Series Processor (TSP) statistical soft-
ware, Version 4.1C, using an AT&T 6386 microcomputer.9 Since optimal proper-
ties of the nonlinear least squares estimator rely on large sample distribu-
tion theory, we compute "asymptotic t-statistics" as ratios of parameter
estimates to estimated asymptotic standard errors; joint hypotheses involving
sets of parameters are tested using the likelihood ratio test criterion.
Our model selection procedure consisted of three steps. In the first
stage, we estimated the five versions of the scope model, five of the scale
model, and then, using the likelihood ratio test criterion, determined which
scope model and which scale model was most parsimonious in the number of
parameters estimated, yet consistent with our data. Given the initial
selection of preferred scope and scale models from Stage 1, in Stage 2 we then
examined parameter estimates and asymptotic standard errors, imposing and
testing whether even more parsimonious parameterizations were consistent with
the data. This yielded one preferred scope model and one preferred scale
model. Finally, since the scope and scale models are non-nested, we attempted
to choose between them using a variety of model selection procedures, ranging
from informal comparisons of fit, empirical plausibility, a Bayesian criter-
ion, and a P-test procedure due to Davidson and MacKinnon [1981]. We now
summarize results we obtained from this three-stage model selection procedure.
Maximum likelihood estimates and asymptotic t-statistics for parameters
in each of the five scope and five scale models, along with equation-specific
summary test statistics, are presented in Tables A-1 and A-2 in the appendix
to this paper. Based on the sample maximized log-likelihood values for each
of these ten estimated models, we conducted a number of hypothesis tests to
select the most parsimonious representations which were consistent with our
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data. The results from this Stage 1 procedure are summarized in Figure 2.
There, the adjusted R2 statistics are shown in parentheses, arrows point from
the restricted model (null hypothesis) to the unrestricted (alternative
hypothesis) model used in each test, and the numbers beside each arrow
indicate the value of the chi-square likelihood ratio test statistics (and
degrees of freedom in parentheses) associated with each of the models being
tested. Next to each arrow is also shown the coefficient or coefficients
whose equality across media is being tested. Finally, in the center of Figure
2 we indicate the number of free parameters estimated for each model.
(Insert Figure 2 Near Here - See Page 44)
We begin with the scope models (5.1)-(5.5), summarized in the left-side
of Figure 2. The first important result observed in Figure 2 is that
parameter restrictions with Models 5.3 and 5.4 as special cases of Model 5.5
are not rejected, nor are the parameter constraints in Model 5.2 rejected as
special cases of either Model 5.3, 5.4 or 5.5; the significance levels of each
of these test results (indicating the significance value at which the null
hypothesis would be rejected) are all small -- less than 90X, indicating that
imposing these more parsimonious parameterizations on the scope model does not
entail losing a statistically significant amount of goodness of fit. Recall
that with Model 5.2, the 's and 's are each constrained to be equal across
media, although the a's (estimated media-specific asymptotic average costs)
are not restricted. Results change, however, when we attempt to constrain the
a's to be equal across media as well; as in seen in Figure 2, the 2 test
statistic for the eight restrictions is 76.50, which turns out to be greater
than the critical value at even the 99.9% level of significance. Based on the
results in Figure 2, therefore, we conclude that Model 5.2 is the most
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parsimonious parameterization of the scope models consistent with our.data,
having eleven parameters.
Results from our estimated scale models are summarized on the right-side
of Figure 2. There it is seen that although Model 12.4 is not rejected as a
special case of Model 12.5 at reasonable significance levels, the parameter
constraints on the 's associated with Model 12.3 as a nested case of Model
12.5 are rejected; the significance level for this rejection is between 97.5%
and 98%. Moreover, if one then tests the restrictions of Model 12.2 as a
special case of Model 12.4, the very large X2 test statistic of 40.954
indicates rejection at significance levels even larger than 99.9%. Various
other hypotheses are also rejected, as is shown in Figure 2. We conclude,
therefore, that based on these test results, Model 12.4 is the most
parsimonious parameterization of the scale models consistent with our data,
having nineteen parmeters.
Given that this first stage of our model selection procedure has yielded
two models -- 5.2 for scope and 12.4 for scale -- whose restrictions are
consistent with the data, we now embark on Stage 2 of the model selection
process, assessing whether any further parameter restrictions on these two
models can help in obtaining a most preferable parsimonious parameterization.
(Insert Figure 3 Near Here -- See Page 45)
Our Stage 2 results are summarized in Figure 3. Based on parameter estimates
for Model 5.2 reported in Table A-1, we imposed and tested five additional
restrictions on the media-specific a's in Model 5.2, and called this Model
5.LA, since it augmented the number of parameters from Model 5.1; the chi-
square test statistic for these five restrictions in Model 5.1A as a special
case of Model 5.2 is 2.128, which is significant only at low levels such as
10-25%. Model 5.1A is therefore our preferred scope model, having but six
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free parameter estimates. The estimated parameters and asymptotic t-
statistics, as well as other summary statistics from Model 5.1A, are presented
in Table 3. To allow for possible heteroscedasticity, we present asymptotic
t-statistics based on both the traditional and heteroscedasticity-robust
standard errors.l0
We then examined the scale model 12.4 that initially emerged from our
Stage 1 model selection process (see Appendix Table A-2), and based on its
estimated parameters and asymptotic t-statistics, we formulated a model
incorporating eleven additional restrictions; since this model augments the
number of parameters associated with Model 12.2, we call this Model 12.2A. As
is shown in Figure 3, the eleven parameter constraints associated with Model
12.2A as a special case of Model 12.4 yield a very low 2 test statistic of
3.014, which is significant only at very small levels less than 1.5%. Model
12.2A is therefore our preferred scale model, having eight free parameters;
these parameter estimates, asymptotic t-statistics (based on both traditional
and heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors) and equation summary statistics
for Model 12.2A are presented in Table 3.
Although traditional statistical inference procedures have helped us
choose one preferred scope (5.1A) and one preferred scale (12.2A) model, and
although these two models have the same dependent variable, they are non-
nested, and thus choice between them is a bit more problematic.
One possible criterion is based on a priori plausibility. For example,
estimated asymptotic average costs (a's) should all be positive; this occurs
for both the preferred scope and the preferred scale model, as is seen in
Table 3. It is worth noting, moreover, that the number of a's whose point
estimate was negative was usually less (and never more) for the various scope
models than for the alternative scale models; see Appendix Tables A-1 and A-2.
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Table 3
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters for Preferred Models
(Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error in Parentheses)
[Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Robust Standard Error in Square Brackets]
Scope Model 5.1A Scale Model 12.2A
aTVL aTVH -
aMGL - PTH
aNPH ' DRH
aRDH - aOTH
aXMB
#TVL ' TVH-
PRDH - MGL 
PNPH - PTH
PDRH ' OTH
PXMB
7
'TVL - TVH 
IRDH - 7MGL -
7NPH P- 7TH -
7DRH - 7OTH
7XMB
ln L
SER
R2 (Adj)
SSR
No. Parameters
Sample Size
Parameter
0.7438
(11.707)
[13.573]
1.3159
(11.210)
[10.034]
2.1667
(8.535)
[8.441]
1.5745
(30.862)
[30.447]
1.9535
(5.721)
[6.397]
1.9535
(5.721)
[6.397]
14.524
(6.022)
[6.079]
14.524
(6.022)
[6.079]
-167.776
.3705
.4718
54.2104
6
0.7383
(11.502)
[13.805]
1.3965
(12.029)
[10.656]
2.1736
(8.307)
[9.060]
1.4499
(18.372)
[19.366]
6.2069
(2.601)
[2.402]
1.0431
(2.747)
[2.863]
302.01
(3.126)
[3.048]
12.438
(2.448)
[2.599]
-169.578
.3731
.4643
54.6998
8
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Moreover, as we shall see later, the estimated ray returns to scale with the
preferred scale model are somewhat erratic, and thus we have a slight
preference on plausibility grounds for the scope model.
A second possible criterion, motivated in part by the fact that the
scope and scale models have the same dependent variable, is based on goodness-
of-fit. An examination of equation summary statistics in Appendix Tables A-1
and A-2 reveals that for any given number of parameters being estimated (e.g.,
3, 11, 19 or 27), in each case the goodness of fit as measured either by the
adjusted R2 or the sample maximized log-likelihood is larger for the scope
than for the corresponding scale model. Further, as seen in Table 3, goodness
of fit as measured by the n L, standard error of the regression (SER), or the
sum of squared residuals (SSR), is uniformly higher for the preferred scope
Model 5.1A than for the preferred scale Model 12.2A, even though the number of
parameters in the scale model (8) is larger than in the scope model (6).
A related procedure for choosing among non-nested models is a Bayesian
criterion due to Zellner and Plosser [1975], implemented empirically by
Berndt, Darrough and Diewert [1977]. If the investigator's prior were diffuse
so that fixed prior weights of one-half had been assigned to Model 5.1A and to
Model 12.2A, then the posterior odds would favor the scope Model 5.1A, for its
a osteriori sample maximized log-likelihood is larger, -167.776 vs. -169.578.
An alternative method for measuring the extent to which the scope model is
preferred a posteriori is to compute the necessary fixed prior weights or odds
for the two models that, together with the sample information, would have made
equal their posterior odds. Zellner and Plosser [1975] have developed an
approximation to the necessary prior odds calculation, which in this context
simply involves subtracting from n L of the scope model 5.1A the n L of the
scale model 12.2A, and then exponentiating this difference (exp (1.802) -
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6.062). Hence, one would have needed to prefer the scale model 12.2A by a
6.062:1 prior odds ratio in order for the scale and scope models to have had
equal posterior odds ratios; alternatively, the a priori weights would have
needed to be 0.1416 (scope) and 0.8584 (scale) in order that a osteriori odds
would have been equal. Based on this Bayesian criterion, therefore, we
conclude that the scope model 5.1A is preferred to the scale model 12.2A.
As a final procedure for choosing among the scope and scale
specifications, we have implemented the procedure for nonlinear models
outlined by Davidson and MacKinnon [1981], which they call a P-test. In this
framework, if the null hypothesis is that Model 1 is true and the alternative
is that some other non-nested Model 2 is false, one runs a linear regression
in which the residuals from Model 1 are regressed on partial derivatives of
Model 1 with respect to each of the parameters in Model 1, and the difference
between fitted values from Models 1 and 2; call this difference DIF12. If the
null hypothesis is true, then the coefficient on DIF12 should be
insignificantly different from zero, and Model 1 would clearly be preferred to
Model 2, for Model 2 adds no significant information. If the coefficient on
DIF12 is statistically significant, however, Model 2 adds some significant
information to Model 1, and choice between models is not clear. In the
Davidson-MacKinnon P-test procedure, one then also simply reverses this
procedure, testing the null hypothesis that Model 2 is true and that some
other non-nested Model 1 is false. In this symmetric regression, one runs a
linear regression in which the residuals from Model 2 are regressed on partial
derivatives of Model 2 with respect to each of the parameters in Model 2, and
the difference between fited values from Models 2 and 1; call this difference
DIF21. If the null hypothesis is true, the coefficeitn on DIF21 should be
insignificantly different from zero; else, choice between models is not clear.
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We have applied the Davidson-MacKinnon procedure here. When the null
hypothesis is that the scope Model 5.1A is true, the coefficient on the DIF12
variable has a t-statistic of 2.237, which is significant at the 95% level of
significance, but not at the 99% level. Apparently, differences in fitted
values between the scope and scale models add explanatory power to the scale
model in a marginally significant way; alternatively, that the scope model is
true is not clear. However, when the null hypothesis is that the scale Model
12.2A is true, the coefficient on the DIF21 variable has a t-statistic of
3.224, which is significant at levels even greater than 99.9%. We conclude,
therefore, that although the evidence is not decisive, there is considerably
more support for the notion that the scope model 5.1A is true, than for the
hypothesis that the scale model 12.2A is correct. While we therefore have a
clear preference for the scope model, in the remainder of this paper we will
present results from both the scope Model 5.1A and the scale Model 12.2A. We
now discuss minimum efficient size estimates based on these two models.
Minimum Efficient Size
In Table 4 we present estimates of Z*, minimum efficient size (MES) for
our two preferred scope and scale models, measured in millions of 1987 dollars
of gross income. These quantities have been calculated for each media
category using equation (2) above, along with parameter estimates shown in
Table 3 for Models 5.1A and 12.2A.
First we comment on the precision of these estimated MES. For our
preferred scope model 5.1A, although the various entries in Column (1) of
Table 4 appear rather similar in magnitude, in fact these media-specific MES
are estimated quite precisely, and most MES estimates are statistically
different from one another. In particular, referring to 3.836 as MES1, 3.443
as MES2, 3.099 as MES3 and 3.319 as MES4, we find that differences between all
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pairs are statistically significant (MES1 - MES2, t - 3.589; MES1 - MES3, t -
4.751; MES1 - MES4, t - 5.275; MES2 - MES3, t - 2.576; MES3 - MES4, t -
2.394), except that between MES2 and MES4, where the t-statistic on the no-
difference null hypothesis is 1.716. Interestingly, the media for which MES
is largest (particularly network television (TVL), spot television (TVH) and
general magazines (MGL)) are also those media whose share of agency revenue
increases most with agency log gross income (see Appendix Table A-3). Hence,
in our scope model, media mix interacts with agency size.
Estimated MES for the preferred scale model are given in Column (4) of
Table 4. Call the 0.223 value, MES5; 0.202, MES6; 0.187, MES7; and 3.438,
MES8. Although the large MES8 value is statistically different from MES1 (t -
2.646), MES2 (t - 2.665) and MES3 (t - 2.680), the t-values for the no
difference null hypothesis between MES1 and MES2 (2.695) and between MES1 and
MES3 (2.966) are similar in magnitude; only the t-value for no difference
between MES2 and MES3 (2.020) is marginal at conventional significance levels.
Note that with this scale model, although the MES for the XMB category (non-
media services) is very large -- 3.438 -- it is estimated imprecisely,
reflecting perhaps the heterogeneity of services included in this composite
category. It is also of interest to note that the very large MES estimate for
this XMB category has distinct implications for overall agency size, since
according to Appendix Table A-3, the XMB share is significantly negatively
correlated with log agency gross income.
Recall that for the scope models, the scale or size variable is total
agency gross income. Hence, the MES estimates shown in Table 4 for Model 5.1A
represent the levels of total gross income required for an agency to operate
with a unit cost 1% above the estimated asymptotic minimum (aj) for some
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Table 4
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Minimum Efficient Agency Size (Z*)
,$ Millions of Income (1987)
(Asymptotic Standard Errors in Parentheses)
Scope Model 5.1A
(1)
MES
Media Agency
Category Income
(2)
% Sample
GI > MES
Scale Model 12.2A
(3)
Implied
Medium
Incomea
(4)
MES
Medium
Income
(5) (6) (7)
% GI>MES % Total
% Sample
GI MES
(8)
Implied
Non-Zero Billings Agency
Sharesb by GI>MESc Incomed
.28613 0.223
(0.062)
.47714 0.223
(0.062)
.36054 0.223
(0.062)
.22285 0.223
(0.062)
.30813 0.202
(0.056)
.15974 0.202
(0.056)
.18565 0.187
(0.051)
.07377 0.187
(0.051)
1.42528 3.438
(1.205)
28.93% 53.46% 99.54% 2.989
48.88% 63.43% 99.15% 1.792
50.37% 55.19% 97.88% 2.372
30.67% 45.90% 92.40% 3.838
49.38% 51.83% 96.73% 2.256
22.44% 34.88% 93.31% 4.351
47.63% 53.80% 96.44% 3.126
22.44% 28.04% 90.05% 7.867
19.70% 21.70% 75.24% 8.006
aMES agency income multiplied by mean media share shown in Table 2.
bpercentage of agencies with non-zero shares in a category with income from
medium greater than the MES estimate.
CPercentage of sample's total billings volume produced by agencies with GI>MES
dMES medium income divided by mean media share shown in Table 2.
TVL
TVH
MGL
PTH
NPH
DRH
RDH
OTH
XMB
3.836
(0.539)
3.836
(0.539)
3.836
(0.539)
3.836
(.539)
3.443
(0.488)
3.443
(0.488)
3.099
(0.440)
3.099
(0.440)
3.319
(0.462)
45.39%
45.39%
45.39%
45.39%
48.38%
48.38%
52.12%
52.12%
49.38%
l
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medium j, assuming the agency's entire output was concentrated in that
medium.1 1 To view these MES estimates of total agency gross income from the
perspective of a "typical" agency operating as a multiproduct firm, we
computed the "Implied Medium Income" by multiplying each estimate of MES total
agency gross income by the corresponding mean share of billings volume
reported in Table 2. The values of these implied medium incomes are shown in
Column 3 of Table 4.
The median gross income for the entire sample of 401 agencies is $3.233
million, and as may be seen from Table 4, that value falls within two standard
errors of the MES point estimate for each of the nine media categories. The
latter range from $3.099 million for each of radio and the "other" category to
$3.836 million for each of network TV, spot TV, general magazines, and special
print. Note that the difference in MES estimates between media categories are
in all cases within two standard errors of one another -- i.e., twice the
value of the asymptotic standard errors which vary from $0.44 to $0.539
million, resulting in a 95% confidence region of $0.88 to $1.078 million.
In line with the observation that the MES estimates lie close to the
sample's median gross income, when these MES point estimates are located
within the distribution of the entire sample's gross incomes, we find that at
least 45% of the agencies had gross incomes which exceeded the MES estimates
for the various media categories (see Column (2) of Table 4). Thus, our
preferred scope model indicates that slightly less than half of the sample
(or, 180-210 agencies) are of sufficient size to operate at minimum efficient
scale. Furthermore, the share of the entire sample's billings accounted for
by agencies with gross incomes greater than the upper and lower values of the
MES estimates for the scope model 5.1A are 92.56% (for MES - $3.836 million)
and 94.26% (for MES - $3.099 million). In light of the fact noted earlier
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that the total billings of this sample of 401 agencies represents more than
60% of total US national advertising expenditures in 1987, we conclude that
the majority of all national advertising is produced by agencies operating at
minimum efficient scale, i.e. a representative transaction is most likely to
emanate from efficient firms.
Table 4 also presents the estimates of MES derived from the preferred
scale model 12.2A, where medium-specific income (Yj) replaces total gross
income (Y) as the size variable. Except for non-media services, the media-
specific MES income estimates (see Column (4)) all fall within a standard
error of one another, varying from $0.187 to $.223 million, with the values
of the estimated asymptotic standard errors ranging from $0.051 to $0.062
million.
Although the variability of the medium-specific MES estimates may appear
limited, the percentage of the agency sample with incomes above these levels
varies markedly among categories. As reported in Column (5) of Table 4, for
each of spot television, radio, general magazines, and newspapers,
approximately 50% of the agency sample had incomes from these media which
exceeded the estimated MES levels. For the other five categories, the
relevant percentages were considerably smaller: special print (30.67%),
network television (28.93%), direct response (22.44%), other (22.44%), and
non-media services (19.70%).
Consistent with the findings for the scope model, agencies with medium-
specific incomes exceeding these MES estimates collectively account for the
overwhelming share of the total sample's billings in each category. For the
nine media categories, the relevant percentages (shown in Column (7) of Table
4) range from a low of 90.05% for "other" to 99.54% for network television.
However, agencies operating above the MES income for non-media services in
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toto represent only 75.24% of the total sample's billings in that category --
a condition which reflects the tendency for smaller agencies to depend more
heavily on fee-based income than larger agencies.
Agencies tend to be specialized with respect to media, as evidenced by
the substantial percentages of the sample with zero shares in several cate-
gories (Table 2). In light of this, we have calculated the share of agencies
with non-zero shares whose incomes exceeded the medium-specific MES estimates
for each category; results are shown in Column (6) of Table 4. For three
categories (direct response, other, and non-media services), the percentage of
agencies with any billings in these categories who also operated with volumes
that exceeded the relevant medium-specific MES is 35% or less. Interestingly,
these three categories are those where billings share tended to be negatively
related to agency size, although in the case of the "other" category, the
relation was not statistically significant (see Appendix Table A3).
A comparison of these medium-specific MES estimates for the scale model
12.2A (Column 4) with the corresponding "Implied Medium Income" obtained from
the scope model 5.1A (Column 3) indicates that the income for a firm with a
media share equal to that of the sample mean would equal or exceed that
required to operate at minimum efficient scale for six of the nine categories
-- network and spot television, general magazines, special print, newspapers
and radio.
This pattern is reversed for direct response, but the difference between
the two values is less than one standard error of the medium-specific MES
estimate. The media-specific MES estimates also exceed the implied values for
both the "other" cateogry ($0.187 vs. $0.074) and non-media services ($3.438
vs. $1.425), and here the differences are substantial. This suggests that
scale economies may be important for these two categories in the sense that
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such economies are not exhausted by agencies with media shares equal to the
sample means. This inference is also consistent with the finding noted above
that the percentages of sample agencies with non-zero billings whose incomes
exceeded the medium-specific MES were the lowest of the nine categories,
28.04% for "other" and 21.70% for non-media services. However, it should also
be noted that these two categories are composites and their aggregate MES
estimates may be unstable.
Dividing the medium-specific MES estimates from the scale model 12.2A by
the corresponding mean media share, we obtain values of the "Implied Agency
Income", shown in Column (7) of Table 4. These values may be compared with
the estimates of MES agency income derived for the scope model 5.1A, shown in
Column (1). For six of the nine categories, the estimate of MES agency income
obtained directly from the scope model was either above or less than one
standard error below the corresponding value "implied" by the scale model.
The discrepant cases are direct response, other, and non-media services.
For each of these categories, the level of total agency income implied by the
medium-specific MES estimate for an agency operating with a share equal to the
sample mean exeeded the estimate from the scope model by a considerable
margin: $4.35 vs. $3.44 for direct response; $7.87 vs. $3.10 for other; and
$8.01 vs. $3.32 for non-media services. The difference for direct response is
less than twice the standard error of the MES estimate for the scope model
($0.488), but for both the "other" category and non-media services, the
differences are more than ten times the relevant standard errors.
Overall, then, the scale and scope models yield a similar picture of the
efficiency of agency operations. For most media categories, income of $3-4
million is required for an agency to attain minimum efficient scale, and
roughly half of the agencies in the sample were operating at that level,
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representing more than 90% of the sample's total billings. The scale and
scope models yielded inconsistent results for the "other" and non-media
services categories. Given that both of these categories are composites,
problems of underlying heterogeneity may have resulted in unreliable estimates
of the parameters entering into the calculations of MES.
Cost Penalties
The preceding results indicated that a substantial fraction of agencies
operate at less than minimum efficient scale, and therefore it becomes
important to ask what magnitude of cost disadvantage results from this
condition. Accordingly, using equation (3) above, we have calculated the cost
penalty borne by an agency operating at an output level equal to half that
required to achieve minimum efficient scale for both of our preferred scale
and scope models. Estimates of these average cost penalties are presented in
Table 5, along with their asymptotic standard errors.
In general, these penalties are of a considerable magnitude in absolute
terms, and larger than similar estimates for several manufacturing industries
reported in the literature (Scherer [1980], pp. 96-97). Consistent with the
presence of significant scope economies, the estimates of the cost penalties
given by the scale model are higher than those obtained from the scope model,
for all media categories except non-media services.
The penalties for operations at less than MES are highest for network
and spot television, general magazines, and special print. The first three of
this latter set of media are those for which larger agencies tend to have
higher shares. Thus it would appear that small agencies can face a
substantial cost disadvantage relative to large agencies in producing and
placing advertising for network and spot television and general magazines. As
noted earlier, smaller agencies tend to have higher shares in direct response
III
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and non-media services, and while the cost penalties for these categories are
somewhat lower than those associated with the major media, they are still of
sufficient size to represent a serious cost disadvantage for the multitude of
very small agencies operating in this industry.
Table 5
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Average Cost Penalty Incurred
at Half Efficient Scale (D*), In Percentage Points
(Estimated Asymptotic Standard Error in Parentheses)
Media Penalty with Penalty with
Abbreviation Category Scope Model 5,1A Scale Model 12.2A
TVL Network 15.06% 27.72%
Television (1.35) (5.95)
TVH Spot 15.06% 27.72%
Television (1.35) (5.95)
MGL General 15.06% 27.72%
Magazines (1.35) (5.95)
PTH Special 15.06% 27.72%
Print (1.35) (5.95)
NPH Newspapers 11.07% 19.88%
(1.12) (4.49)
DRH Direct 11.07% 19.88%
Response (1.12) (4.49)
RDH Radio 8.41% 15.74%
(0.86) (3.42)
OTH Other 8.41% 15.74%
(0.86) (3.42)
XMB Non-Media 10.04% 7.41%
Services (0.87) (1.45)
Returns to Scope
The possible cost advantages accruing to an agency with a broad media mix
as compared to a narrow one may be evaluated by estimating returns to scope. 2
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This quantity represents the percentage cost saving realized from the joint
production of some mix of agency services over the cost of producing the elements
of that mix separately, as defined above in equations (7)-(9). We have
calculated estimates of these savings using parameter values from our preferred
scope model 5.1A; the results are summarized in histogram form in Figure 4.
(Insert Figure 4 Near Here -- See Page 46)
We find that scope economies are substantial. The median cost saving from
joint production is 26.43% (mean: 29.53%), with a range from essentially zero to
86.45%. Moreover, as is evident from Figure 4, the distribution is highly skewed
in the direction of large cost savings. To explore how these scope economies
vary with agency size, we constructed the scatter diagram (see Figure 5) where
cost savings percentages are plotted against agency gross income.
(Insert Figure 5 Near Here -- See Page 47)
Clearly, a marked tendency exists for the cost savings percentage to
decline as agency gross income increases. Scope economies appear to be virtually
exhausted for the handful of very large agencies with gross incomes of $100
million or more. However, among the smallest agencies (e.g., those with gross
incomes of $2 million or less and hence below half minimum efficient scale),
there is a very large amount of variation in the cost savings percentage that is
unrelated to size. Thus, although scope economies are exhausted for the very
largest firms, we also find strong evidence that scope economies are of
considerable consequence to small firms, for their costs are particularly
sensitive to the mix of media services provided.
Ray Returns to Scale
Earlier in Section II we noted that for multiproduct firms the concept of
returns to scale is inherently ambiguous. One possible measure of size-related
economies, however, is the notion of ray returns to scale (RRS), defined in
_I___I11_I11- I;i--·--l----i---_I?-l-Xml*CTPi--IF?
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equation (10). Essentially, RRS is one over the elasticity of total costs with
respect to total output Yi, holding fixed the output mix, i.e., Sij - ij.
Using equation (11) with the parameter restrictions from model 5.1A
imposed, we have computed agency-specific RRS based on our preferred scope model.
Our results are summarized in histogram form in Figure 6. A number of findings
are worth noting.
(Insert Figure 6 Near Here -- See Page 48)
First, the mean value of RRS is 1.182, but the median is less, being only
1.065. This reflects a rather skewed distribution, with 192 of our 401 agencies
(47.9%) having RRS in the region of 1.00 to 1.05. Indeed, 77 of these 192
agencies display RRS that are virtually constant, being in the range of 1.000 <
RRS < 1.001. Second, since RRS can be envisaged as the ratio of average to
marginal cost, the large number of RRS near one suggests again that a very
substantial number of advertising agencies in our sample are sufficiently large
to have exhausted virtually all available scale economies and are producing at
minimal marginal cost. Third and finally, although many agencies are efficient,
a considerable number are small and as a consequence, they have been unable to
exploit potential scale economies; 47 of our 401 agencies (11.72%), for example,
display RRS of greater than 1.50 (the largest value is 1.873), and for these
agencies the ratio of average to incremental cost is significant. Of the 401
agencies, 71 (17.71%) have RRS in the range of 1.25 to 1.50, while 91 (22.69Z)
fall in the 1.05 < RRS < 1.25 range.
We have also computed RRS using parameter values from our preferred scale
model 12.2A, based on equation (13) with appropriate restrictions imposed.
Unlike the case for our preferred scope model, however, with our preferred scale
model values of RRS are extremely volatile. Although mean and median values of
RRS are 1.555 and 1.020, respectively, for the preferred scale model the standard
-Page 37-
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deviation of RRS is 12.700, almost sixty times larger than the 0.214 value for
the preferred scope model; the estimated RRS for the scale model range from
-153.571 to 123.546.
The reason such extreme variability occurs with the preferred scale model
can be seen by examining equation (13) and values of the estimated 7j parameters
in Table 3 for model 12.2A. The large positive value of j for eight of the nine
media (302.01, with an asymptotic standard error of almost 100) implies that for
those agencies having large Sij media shares, the last term in the denominator of
(13) becomes volatile and occasionally negative, resulting in erratic and even
negative estimated RRS. Note that because the troublesome 7j parameter has a
large standard error, the confidence region of our estimated RRS for the
preferred scale model is also very large.1 3
We conclude therefore that, unlike the case of our preferred scope model
5.1A, for the preferred scale model 12.2A we are unable to obtain reliable and
plausible estimates of RRS.
Discussion
Our results suggest several conclusions regarding the importance of scale
and scope economies. First, approximately 200-250 agencies had gross incomes of
$3-4 million or more in 1987 and hence were large enough to have realized
essentially all size-related efficiencies.1 4 At least half of the total amount
expended in the US on national advertising in 1987 was the product of agencies
operating at minimum efficient scale. It is well-known that agencies compete
fiercely with one another in bidding for accounts, and these findings indicate
that the majority of the industry's output is produced by efficient agency
operations.
Second, very small agencies (gross incomes of $1.5-2.0 million or less in
1987) appear to bear substantial cost disadvantages that are related to both the
_____1__1_1
SCALE AND SCOPE EFFECTS - Page 39 -
scale and scope of their operations -- a condition of considerable consequence
given the existence of more than 12,000 agencies in the US, according to the
count from the 1987 Census of Services.
Third, large agencies tend to derive larger shares of their incomes from
media and services with lower asymptotic costs than do smaller agencies. In
particular, three of the four media categories with the lowest asymptotic unit
costs and highest cost penalties (network and spot television, and general
magazines) are those for which the cross-sectional associations between media
share and total agency gross income are positive (see Appendix A3). Although we
lack the data necessary to investigate this matter in detail, informed industry
opinion would support the conjecture that these size-related differences in
agencies' media mixes are more a reflection of size-related differences in
clientele served than a consequence of any cost advantage due to scale economies.
Clients with large budgets are those most likely to expend substantial amounts on
national campaigns in television and magazines and for various reasons, they also
tend to favor large agencies over small ones. SSB ([1983, pp. 471-473) present
some earlier evidence consistent with this line of argument.
The results obtained here have implications for a number of issues raised
in the introduction concerning the organization of the advertising agency
industry. First, it appears unlikely that any benefits due to scale economies in
domestic US operations per se are to be realized by mergers among the largest 200
or so agencies, since they have already achieved minimum efficient scale.
However, our estimates concerning the significance of scope economies suggest the
possibility that additional efficiency gains might still be realized by some
large agencies who expand the mix of services offered through acquisitions. In
light of our inability to disaggregate "non-media services" into more homogeneous
elements, such a suggestion remains speculative. Clearly, our results indicate
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that economies of both scale and scope offer substantial incentives for mergers
and acquisitions among smaller agencies.
Also, economies of scale and scope in operating costs would not appear to
offer a viable explanation for the low incidence of in-house agencies, as has
sometimes been suggested. The estimates of minimum efficient agency size
obtained from our preferred scope model are in the $3-4 million range, which
implies that advertisers with billings of $20-26.7 million could operate fully
efficient house agencies. Each of the largest 200 national advertisers in the US
had expenditures which exceeded these levels in 1987, but less than 5% of them
operated in-house agencies (Advertising Age [1988b,c]).
Further, our evidence of economies of scale is consistent with the trend
away from reliance on fixed commission rates in agency compensation arrangements.
If all the scale economies captured in our cost model held at the individual
account level, then our estimates imply that, on average, larger accounts would
be less costly to serve than smaller ones, up to billings levels of $20-26.7
million. However, since our estimates are based on data from a cross section of
agencies and not from individual accounts, such a conjecture must be taken as
speculative.
Finally, although the evidence is not decisive, on the basis of a priori
plausibility, goodness of fit, and the Davidson-MacKinnon specification tests, we
conclude that our estimated preferred scope model 5.1A dominates the preferred
scale model 12.2A. In the advertising agency industry, economies of scope appear
to be important.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
How important are economies of scale and scope in advertising agency
operations? This paper reported an econometric study undertaken to address this
question. Cost models were formulated which represent how the principal
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component of agency costs, employment level, varies according to the mix of media
and services an agency provides and the total volume of advertising it produces.
These models were estimated and tested cross-sectionally utilizing data
pertaining to the domestic operations of 401 US agencies for 1987.
The empirical evidence reported here indicates that both scale and scope
economies are highly significant in the operations of US advertising agencies.
We find that of the 12,000 establishments comprising the industry in 1987,
approximately 200-250 had domestic gross incomes of $3-4 million or more (or
equivalently, billings of $20-27 million) and therefore had service mixes and
operating levels sufficiently large to take full advantage of all available size-
related efficiencies. Furthermore, the overall structure of the industry is one
where these large, fully efficient firms created and produced more than half of
all the national advertising utilized in the US during 1987. At the same time,
vast numbers of very small agencies appear to operate with substantial cost
disadvantages compared to large firms as a consequence of these scale and scope
economies.
These findings carry important implications concerning possible future
changes in the industry structure. It seems highly doubtful that scale economies
could motivate further mergers among the largest 200-250 agencies. On the other
hand, for small agencies, mergers and acquisitions might be attractive as means
of mitigating their size-related cost disadvantages. Finally, our findings
demonstrating the existence of scale and scope economies are consistent with the
diminishing reliance on fixed rates of media commissions as the principal basis
of agency compensation. They also cast strong doubts on size-related economies
in operating costs as a viable explanation for the limited degree of vertical
integration of agency services by large advertisers (Silk [1989]).
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The structure and behavior of advertising agency costs are clearly subjects
which deserve further attention. Access to more detailed and disaggregated cost
data could facilitate investigation of several issues left unresolved here, and
also would permit analysis of additional questions of importance which have not
yet been addressed in this study. Cost measures which go beyond the proxy for
payroll expenses generally relied upon in discussions of agency economics would
certainly be welcome. It would also be desirable to be able to decompose "non-
media services" into more specific components. Examination of costs at a more
micro level could cast considerable light on the efficiencies which may be
associated with recent agency efforts to offer broader and more integrated
services to clients. The availability of cross-sectional data at the level of
individual accounts or clients (rather than entire agencies) would support
development of more complex structural models to test the hypothesis noted above
that the greater efficiency of large agencies arises from the size and
media/service mix of the clients they serve. As Weilbacher [1990] has suggested,
an understanding of account level cost behavior could contribute much to
addressing contemporary questions and concerns about the economics of alternative
agency compensation plans. Finally, the present focus on domestic agency
activities leaves entirely open the question of how scale and scope economies may
affect multinational agency operations.
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FIG. 1 .- Basic exponential cost function
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FIGURE 3. LIKELIHOOD RATIO TESTS FOR RESTRICTED
NESTED SPECIFICATIONS
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FIGURE 4
Distribution Of Returns To Scope: Model 5.1A
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FIGURE 6
Distribution Of Returns To Scale: Model 5.1A)
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APPENDIX TABLE A-1
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters for Alternative Scope Models
(Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error in Parentheses)
Model 5.1 Model 5.2 Model 5.3 Model 5.4
1.187
(37.06)
0.748
(5.533)
0.845
(6.512)
0.539
(2.832)
0.832
(4.581)
1.429
(8.245)
1.210
(6.822)
2.009
(5.531)
2.270
(4.532)
1.573
(30.36)
1.636
(9.166)
0.750
(5.069)
0.839
(5.582)
0.509
(2.096)
0.956
(4.344)
1.543
(7.574)
1.068
(4.423)
2.025
(4.342)
2.360
(3.277)
1.511
(21.87)
1.902
(5.781)
0.791
(5.151)
0.909
(5.894)
0.501
(1.859)
0.941
(4.788)
1.519
(8.173)
0.698
(1.767)
1.948
(3.661)
0.887
(0.950)
1.542
(21.53)
2.020
(5.380)
1.380
(0.402)
1.785
(1.400)
1.742
(1.224)
-0.068
(0.041)
-0.211
(0.153)
Parameter
aTVL
aTVH
aMGL
aPTH
Model 5.5
aNPH
aDRH
aRDH
aOTH
aXMB
0.835
(5.034)
0.943
(6.306)
0.532
(1.707)
0.916
(4.792)
1.509
(8.191)
0.803
(1.882)
1.933
(3.329)
-1.684
(0.473)
1.513
(18.86)
PTVL
fTVH
-MGL
$PTH
PNPH
5.621
(0.141)
6.279
(0.312)
1.300
(0.546)
43.298
(0.188)
75.561
(0.139)
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2.528
(2.388)
1.545
(0.479)
1.880
(0.562)
1.929
(5.898)
8.264
(7.031)
14.044
(5.894)
11.726
(5.459)
15.902
(0.724)
17.433
(1.492)
12.496
(1.569)
33.029
(0.605)
38.775
(0.555)
4.356
(1.348)
12.007
(0.801)
0.625
(0.387)
13.310
(4.330)
-204.962
.4049
.3690
65.257
-166.712
.3718
.4679
53.924
-164.887
.3740
.4617
53.435
-162.063
.3714
.4692
52.688
No. of Free
Parameters 3 11 19
1.627
(2.425)
1.198
(0.229)
4.865
(1.379)
1.648
(3.702)
PDRH
PRDH
POTH
PXMB
7TVL
'YTVH
YMGL
YNPH
YDRH
YRDH
YOTH
YXMB
In L
SER
R2 (Adj)
SSR
22.546
(0.350)
34.301
(0.576)
9.663
(0.481)
57.985
(0.672)
78.623
(0.625)
3.996
(0.934)
9.257
(0.258)
0.404
(0.673)
10.663
(3.031)
-160.101
.3734
.4634
52.151
-------- 
---
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APPENDIX TABLE A-2
Maximum Likelihood Estimates of Parameters for Alternative Scale Models
(Ratio of Parameter Estimate to Asymptotic Standard Error in Parentheses)
Model 12.1 Model 12.2 Model 12.3 Model 12.4 Model 12.5
1.259
(49.49)
0.852
(5.929)
0.814
(5.962)
0.255
(1.219)
0.663
(3.407)
1.327
(7.171)
1.224
(6.433)
1.046
(2.566)
1.617
(2.971)
1.630
(31.48)
17.171
(6.229)
0.775
(5.132)
0.813
(5.665)
0.417
(1.674)
0.792
(3.564)
1.530
(7.597)
1.101
(4.537)
1.724
(3.123)
1.277
(1.212)
1.526
(23.27)
1.375
(4.941)
0.768
(5.451)
0.841
(6.272)
0.519
(2.596)
0.812
(4.277)
1.391
(7.748)
-0.108
(0.209)
1.770
(4.469)
1.731
(1.387)
1.500
(22.08)
0.743
(5.000)
0.861
(6.392)
0.579
(2.921)
0.890
(4.695)
1.350
(7.536)
0.578
(0.650)
2.399
(1.127)
1.471
(1.027)
1.453
(17.72)
1.908
(4.982)
0.262
(0.221)
1.073
(1.334)
0.729
(0.893)
73.450
(0.756)
7.096
(2.071)
18.864
(0.445)
0.094
(0.127)
11.311
(1.126)
-1.156
(1.284) (0.005)
1.428
(1.820)
1.215
(1.613)
Parameter
CTVL
CTVH
aMGL
0 PTH
aNPH
aDRH
aRDH
aOTH
cXMB
0TVL
fTVH
PMGL
6PTH
PNPH
PDRH
_ill
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0RDH
pOTH
,
0XMB
-'TVL
'TTVH
'MGL
'PTH
'NPH
'DRH
'RDH
'OTH
YXMB
in L
SER
R2 (Adj)
SSR
359.49
(6.693)
-215.933
.4162
.3335
68.928
No. of Free
Parameters
NOTE: **** implies that due to near singularity, parameter value could not be
computed.
0.002
(0.001)
2.554
(1.321)
2.359
(5.390)
-0.742
(0.387)
28.457
(3.299)
2.325
(1.199)
1.210
(3.108)
18.590
(4.869)
226.320
(0.238)
63.698
(1.226)
96.970
(1.028)
203.750
(0.589)
2344.6
(0.931)
102.99
(2.489)
1091.2
(0.689)
298.19
(1.535)
273.460
(0.428)
1.222
(1.216)
146.610
(0.551)
32.527
(0.464)
17.501
(3.995)
2.791
(0.509)
3.412
(0.179)
27.058
(0.520)
12.063
(2.747)
-163.565
.3767
.4538
53.084
-188.548
.3926
.4067
60.128
-172.407
.3811
.4411
55.477
-168.071
.3770
.4530
54.290
3 11 19 19 27
II
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APPENDIX TABLE A-3
Regression Results: Media Share on Log Gross Income
Abbreviation
Media
Category Share
Slope Coefficient
(t-Statistic)
Network Television
Spot Television
General Magazines
Special Print
Newspapers
Direct Response
Radio
Other
0.0552
(12.022)*
0.0316
(5.741)*
0.0094
(2.599)*
-0.0051
(1.320)
0.0020
(0.479)
-0.0087
(2.090)**
0.0020
(0.904)
-0.0022
(1.454)
Non-Media Services -0.8426
(8.082)*
Two-tail test of significane (n - 401 for all regressions):
* P < .01 P < .05
TVL
TVH
MGL
PTH
0.266
NPH
0.076
0.017
0.004
DRH
RDH
0.001
OTH
0.011
XMB
0.002
0.005
0.141
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FOOTNOTES
1The exceptions are Leffler and Sauer [1984], Palda [1988], and Simon [1970,
Chapter 6].
2We contemplated using "flexible" functional forms such as the well-known
translog function (see Berndt [1991], Chapter 9), but found them to be
impractical since in our sample, for many agencies a number of outputs take on
zero values. With zero values, one cannot employ logarithmic forms such as
the translog, and use of other polynomial transformations is also
problematical.
3See, for example, F. M. Scherer [1980, pp. 96-97].
4A useful discussion of scope economies and references to literature is given
in Bailey and Friedlaender [1982].
5As detailed below, the Yij are estimated, based on billings, not gross
income.
6Details of how the agencies were selected are not reported.
7For several decades, the American Association of Advertising Agencies
released summaries of their annual agency cost surveys which showed that
payroll and related expenses averaged about 65% of gross income and tended to
be stable over time (Advertising Age [1983, p. 84]). Regrettably, after 1982,
that practice ceased and since then only occasionally have portions of these
data appeared in published sources (e.g., McDonald [1989] and McNamara [1990].
8Summary data published from surveys of compensation levels of agency
personnel show average compensation per employee increasing with agency
billings size (Cole and Sizing [1988]. This effect may be explained, at least
partially, by the tendency for large agencies to be located in large, high
wage metropolitan areas. Also, reported salaries for incorporated agencies
may be higher as a result of firms seeking to avoid double taxation of
dividends. To the extent that average compensation per employee does increase
with agency size, then we may overestimate the importance of scale economies
by taking employees as a proxy of cost.
9As a practical matter, we estimated the most restrictive models first, and
then used parameter estimates from these converged models as starting values
for the more general models. Although we cannot be absolutely certain that we
have found the global minimum sums of squared residuals for each of these
models, we have obtained the same converged values for each model using
several different starting values. The only model for which we experienced
substantial convergence difficulties was Model 12.5.
10The heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors have been calculated using the
formulae developed by White [1980]. We examined residuals from our various
estimated models, and found that for all models, larger variances tended to be
more common for the smaller firms. However, we attempted various ways of
modelling this heteroscedasticity, and none yielded statistically significant
findings.
11 For our preferred scope model 5.1A, it can be shown that for some media
category j, the expression (2) for the gross income of an agency operating at
SCALE AND SCOPE EFFECTS
minimum efficient scale becomes: Z* - (1/7) in (0.01ajSj/P). The estimates
of MES shown in Table 4 have been calculated by setting S - 1 in the above
expression. That is, the MES estimates for model 5.LA assume that an agency's
total output is concentrated in a single medium.
12For a discussion of industry structure implications of economies of scope in
a somewhat different context, see Chiang and Friedlaender [1985].
13 For other variants of the estimated scale models, we also found large
variability and correspondingly huge standard errors for the media-specific yj
parameters (see Appendix Table A-2), much larger than those for the estimated
scope models (see Appendix Table A-I).
14 Advertising Age's [1988a] "U.S. Advertising Agency Profile" for 1987 lists
248 agencies with U.S. gross incomes over $3 million and 207 with gross
incomes above $4 million.
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